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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred By Applying A Subjective Test To Determine Whether
The Arresting Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend His Traffic
Stop Of Smith To Utilize A Drug Sniffing Dog
Introduction

A.

The district court erred when it relied on Officer Scheierman's subjective
beliefs in concluding that Scheierman "abandoned" the original purpose of the
traffic stop prior to deploying his drug-sniffing dog, and prior to acquiring
reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop.

(See generally,

Appellant's brief.) The district court thus erred when it granted Smith's motion to
suppress.
Smith contends that that the district court's analysis "had nothing to do
with the officer's personal belief."

(Respondent's brief, pp.7-14.)

Smith also

contends that, despite ultimately granting Smith's motion to suppress, the district
court erred in concluding that Officer Scheierman's initial questioning of Smith
about his travels did not unlawfully extend the duration of the detention.
(Respondent's brief, pp.14-17.) Additionally, Smith raises, for the first time on
appeal, two alternative grounds for suppression - that Officer Scheierman
unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop both by executing a
nationwide driver's license check following his initial state warrant check and by
patting Smith down for weapons after requesting that Smith leave his vehicle.
(Id.)
Smith's argument fails because the record reveals that the district court
applied

an

incorrect subjective

analysis
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in

concluding

that Scheierman

abandoned the original purpose of the traffic stop while the nationwide driver's
license check he initiated was still pending. Further, Smith has failed to show
that the approximately five-to-seven minutes that elapsed between Scheierman's
initial approach to Smith's vehicle and the conclusion of Scheierman's initial
questioning of Smith took an unreasonable amount of time or unlawfully
extended the traffic stop.

Finally, Smith failed to preserve his arguments that

Scheierman's nationwide driver's license check or pat-down of Smith unlawfully
extended the traffic stop.

B.

Scheierman Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend The Traffic Stop
To Deploy The Drug Sniffing Dog
A police officer may not significantly extend the duration of a traffic stop

detention to investigate other criminal conduct. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,
983-984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). However, the purpose of a stop,
and the length of the stop to effectuate its purpose, is not necessarily fixed at the
time of initiation.

See,~,

State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913,917,42 P.3d 706,

710 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the vehicular stop began as one to investigate the
operation of an unregistered automobile, information quickly developed which
justified expansion of the detention to investigate a possible drug offense.").

In

addition, an officer may briefly detain a driver with whom he has made a lawful
contact for the purpose of executing a license and warrant check.

State v.

Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493-496, 826 P.2d 452, 454-457 (1992).

However,

officer questions unrelated to a stop, asked "after the purpose of the stop has
been fulfilled," "extend[] the duration of the stop," and constitute a Fourth
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Amendment violation. State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8-9, 217 P.3d 1, 8-9 (Ct.
App.2009).
The presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective test that does not
depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes. State v.
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v. State,
131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998)); see also Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996).
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that, by the time the
nationwide driver's license check was completed, Scheierman had acquired
reasonable suspicion of drug activity that justified briefly extending the traffic stop
to deploy his drug-sniffing dog.
generally.)

(R., pp.156-157; see also Appellant's brief,

However, the district court erred when it drew a line earlier in the

traffic stop, at a point where the nationwide check was still pending, where, it
concluded, Scheierman took a "constitutionally impermissible 'wrong turn'" by
focusing on Smith's suspected drug activity and "abandoning" the original
purpose of the traffic stop. (R., pp.156-162.) The court reasoned:
Therefore, based upon Scheierman's testimony one event or a
series of events transformed this stop from a routine traffic stop to
one where Scheierman believed he had "reasonable suspicion" to
broaden the scope of the stop and detain Smith for reasons
different than the initial stop. As such, it is this period of time which
the [c]ourt must analyze in determining whether or not Smith's
Fourth Amendment Rights have been infringed upon.
(R., p.158.)

The district court concluded that at this point earlier in the traffic

stop, Scheierman lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.
pp.156-162.)
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(R.,

Smith contends that the state has taken the district court's statements out
context and that rather than considering Scheierman's subjective beliefs, the
court actually considered Scheierman's actions (his questioning of Smith
about Smith's travels and drug activity), and inactions (his faiiure to write Smith a
speeding ticket or otherwise investigate the speeding infraction). (Respondent's
brief, pp.7-14.)
Smith's reasoning however, and the reasoning of the district court below,
is flawed. During the brief period of time where the nationwide driver's license
check was still pending, none of Scheierman's actions, inactions, or subjective
beliefs that motivated those actions or inactions, unlawfully extended the traffic
stop. While the nationwide check was still pending, Scheierman was still lawfully
detaining Smith for purposes related to the original stop. See Godwin, 121 Idaho
at 493-496, 826 P.2d at 454-457.

During this time, neither Scheierman's

questions unrelated to the suspected speeding infraction, nor his decision not to
write Smith a ticket for speeding or otherwise further investigate Smith's
suspected speeding infraction, extended the duration of the traffic stop.
Scheierman did not extend the stop beyond its original purpose, or fully abandon
the original purpose of the stop, until the nationwide check was completed and
Scheierman deployed his drug-sniffing dog.
State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005), relied on
by both the district court below and Smith on appeal (R., pp.159-162;
Respondent's brief, pp.8-13), is distinguishable.

Officers followed Aguirre's

vehicle for four to five miles after they observed him circling the traffic stop of
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another vehicle and then leaving a parking lot without stopping.
112 P.3d at 849-852.

kL

at 561-564,

While officers followed Aguirre, they "checked for

outstanding warrants and other pertinent information."

The

who then

effectuated the traffic stop asked Aguirre why he had been circling the area,
requested that Aguirre present his driver's license, registration, and proof
insurance, and then asked whether Aguirre had anything illegal in his vehicle.

kL

at 561-562, 112 P.3d at 849-850. After Aguirre refused the officer's request to
search his vehicle, the officer deployed his drug-sniffing dog, which alerted on
contraband.

kL

The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that, after the traffic stop, the officers in
Aguirre made no effort to further pursue the initial purpose of the stop or dispel
any concern as to why Aguirre had been circling the area.

kL

However, it was

not this inaction, standing alone, that prompted the Court's conclusion that the
officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop.

Instead, the Court reached its

conclusion because the officers had already completed all normal procedures for
a routine traffic stop, including the warrant and license checks, prior to
questioning Aguirre about weapons, requesting consent to search his vehicle,
and deploying the drug-sniffing dog.

kL

To the contrary, in the present case, all

normal procedures for a routine traffic stop were not completed until the
nationwide driver's license check came back, by which pOint Scheierman had
reasonable suspicion to briefly extend the duration of the traffic stop to deploy his
drug-sniffing dog.
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The district court incorrectly conducted a reasonable suspicion analysis
based on the subjective beliefs of Officer Scheierman, rather than determine if
Scheierman's objective actions extended the duration

the traffic stop.

Reversal and remand for application of the correct objective analysis is therefore
appropriate.

C.

Smith Has Failed To Preserve His Argument That Scheierman's
Nationwide Driver's License Check Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop
For the first time on appeal, Smith contends that the district court erred by

not concluding that Scheierman unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic
stop by executing a "nationwide" driver's license check, which Smith contends
was "duplicative" of the previously-executed state license and warrant check.
(Respondent's brief, pp.17-18, 20.)

However, issues not raised to the district

court may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121
Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); see also State v. Holland, 135 Idaho
159, 161-162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a
defendant has the burden to present grounds for his motion to suppress to the
trial court, and may not raise alternative suppression grounds for the first time on
appeal.)

Because Smith failed to raise this issue below, the state did not have

the direct opportunity to respond with evidence or argument to challenge it, and
the district court did not have the opportunity to consider it. Smith is therefore
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal.
Even if this Court considers this argument, Smith has failed to show that
the district court erred. Scheierman's nationwide driver's license check was not
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duplicative of his prior, state warrant and driver's license check. The two checks
served different purposes, were conducted in different manners, and did not take
an unreasonable amount of time to complete. As Scheierman testified,

initial

state license and warrant check, which is performed on the patrol car computer
and which took approximately one minute to complete, reveals whether a driver
is validly licensed in the state that issued his license (in this case, Colorado), and
whether the driver has any outstanding warrants. (Tr., p.13, L.12 - p.14, L.20.)
The primary purpose of this initial check is officer safety, to quickly reveal
whether the stopped individual may be dangerous.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.3-B.)

The

"nationwide" check, which is processed through dispatch, and which took
approximately five minutes to complete, reveals whether a driver has a
suspended license in any state.

(Tr., p.13, L.12 - p.16, L.1.) The cumulative

duration of these two checks was reasonable, and the cumulative purposes of
the checks justified this brief detention.
Smith failed to preserve his argument that Scheierman's nationwide
driver's license check unlawfully extended the traffic stop. Even if this issue was
preserved, Scheierman has failed to show that the district court erred in declining
to conclude that the two checks were "duplicitous," and unlawfully extended the
stop.

D.

Smith Has Failed To Preserve His Argument That Scheierman's Pat-Down
Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop
For the first time on appeal, Smith contends that Scheierman's weapon

pat-down of Smith unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop.
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(Respondent's brief, pp.18-19.) However, as discussed above, issues not raised
to the district court may generally not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Fodge, 121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d

126; see also State v. Holland, 135 Idaho

159,161-162,15 P.3d 1167, 1169-1170 (Ct. App. 2000). Because Smith failed
to raise this issue below, the state did not have the opportunity to respond with
evidence or argument to challenge it, and the district court did not have the
opportunity to consider it. Smith is therefore precluded from raising it for the first
time on appeal.
Even if this Court considers this argument, Smith has failed to show that
the district court erred. Scheierman patted Smith down after he asked Smith to
exit his vehicle, but prior to the completion of the nationwide driver's license
check.

(R., p.53.)

At this time, as discussed above, Scheierman had not

extended the druation of the stop to investigate matters other than the basis for
the stop. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the pat-down took
more than a few seconds to complete, or was not either consensual, or a
justifiable "Terry frisk."1

Therefore, the pat-down did not unlawfully extend the

duration of the traffic stop.
Smith's reliance on State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,658, 152 P.3d 16, 19
(2007), is misplaced. In Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court evaluated a police
officer's pat-down search of a suspect which revealed methamphetamine and

Because Smith did not challenge Scheierman's pat-down below, and because
Scheierman was not questioned about the pat-down during the hearing on the
motion to suppress, it is unclear from the record whether Smith consented to the
pat-down, whether Smith performed a "Terry frisk," or, in the case of the latter,
what circumstances justified such a frisk. (R., p.53); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
1

8

drug paraphernalia that Henage sought to suppress.

Id.

Thus, Henage

presented a Fourth Amendment search analysis regarding whether Henage's
reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed. The reasoning of Henage
has no application to the present case, which presents a Fourth Amendment
seizure analysis. Scheierman's pat-down of Smith did not reveal any contraband
and did not implicate the issue raised by the motion to suppress in this case whether Scheierman unlawfully extended the traffic stop prior to obtaining
reasonable suspicion that Smith was involved in drug activity.
Smith failed to preserve his argument that Scheierman's pat-down
unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop.

Even if the issue was

preserved, Smith has failed to show that the district court erred by declining to
conclude that Scheierman's pat-down unlawfully extended the traffic stop.

E.

Scheierman's Initial Approach And Conversation With Smith Did Not
Unreasonably Extend The Traffic Stop
Officers have limited discretion to conduct brief inquiries unrelated to the

purpose of a traffic stop. State v. Parkinson 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301,
306 (Ct. App. 2000).

For example, it is not necessarily a Fourth Amendment

violation for an officer who has lawfully stopped someone for a traffic violation to
ask questions about drugs and weapons, as long as such questions do not
significantly extend the duration of the stop beyond its original purpose. Aguirre,
141 Idaho at 563,112 P.3d at 851; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363,17 P.3d at
306-307; State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App.
2008). An officer may also ask the driver for his license and registration, request
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that the driver exit his vehicle, and ask
purpose on the road. Parkinson 135 Idaho

about his destination and
363, 17 P.3d at 307; Grantham,

146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134.
Smith contends that the district court erred in concluding that the initial
portion of the traffic stop, which included Scheierman's first contact with Smith,
did not unlavvfully extend the duration of the traffic stop.
pp.14-17.)

(Respondent's brief,

Specifically, Smith contends that Scheierman significantly and

unlawfully extended the duration of the stop during this five-to-seven minute
period by inquiring about the nature of Scheierman's travels. (Id.)
Smith, however, cannot show from the existing record that the district
court erred.

The fact that Scheierman inquired about the purpose of Smith's

travels did not itself unlawfully prolong the duration of the traffic stop.

See

Parkinson 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198
P.3d at 134.

Further, the amount of time Scheierman actually spent inquiring

about Smith's travels during this portion of the traffic stop cannot be ascertained
from the record, because the five-to-seven minute period at issue also included:
Scheierman's initial approach to Smith's vehicle, Scheierman's request for Smith
to roll down his window, Smith's compliance with that request, Scheierman's
apprising Smith of the purpose of the stop, Smith's apology for speeding and
claim that he was not aware of the posted speed limit, Scheierman's request for
Smith's driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance, and Smith's
collection and presentation of this documentation. (R., pp.74-81; 152; Tr., p.9,
L.3 - p.13, L.8.) Five to seven minutes is not an unreasonable amount of time to
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cumulatively complete these tasks, along with permissible brief questioning about
Smith's travels. Nor did the entire traffic stop, which took 15 minutes from the
Smith's arrest (R., p.91; Tr., p.28, Ls.13-18), take an unreasonably long
time.
Smith has failed to show, from the existing record, that the district court
erred in concluding that Scheierman did not unlawfully extend the duration of the
traffic stop during the five-to-seven minute interval between Scheierman's initial
approach to Smith's vehicle, and the conclusion of his initial contact with Smith.
Smith has therefore failed to establish alternative grounds for suppression.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence recovered in Smith's vehicle and to remand for
further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of October, 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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causing a copy addressed to:
SARA B. THOMAS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
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